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JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND "THE THREAT TO
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE": The Cowgirl Who

Cried Wolf?.
t
Arthur D. Hellman

Early this year, when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor swore in a group of
newly elected Arizona state officials, she was heard to say, "I'm just an
unemployed cowgirl now."' Well, not quite. Justice O'Connor may have
retired from active service on the United States Supreme Court, but she is
hardly unemployed. As Newsweek magazine reported in February, "[h]er
current schedule-packed with appeals court hearings, law school lectures,
speechmaking and book writing-can make her days on the court look
practically languorous." 2
In this whirlwind of activity, one topic stands out. As her principal
"retirement project," Justice O'Connor has taken on the task of defending
the independence of the judiciary. She began her campaign even before she
retired, with a dedicatory address at the University of Florida School of Law
in September 2005. In that speech she reviewed recent controversies and
warned: "The experience of developing countries, former communist
countries, and our own political culture teaches us that we must be ever
vigilant against those who would strong-arm the judiciary into adopting
their preferred policies." 3 Two months later, she delivered a similar speech
in Washington at the meeting of the American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers.
Since then, Justice O'Connor has spoken on the subject in speeches and
public interviews in Virginia (William & Mary), North Carolina (Wake
Forest), New York (NYU), Massachusetts (Harvard), and many other
places. She has also published a hard-hitting op-ed in the Wall Street
t
Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. This article is based on remarks prepared for a Symposium held at the Sandra
Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University on March 23, 2007. The article
retains the conversational style of the lecture, adding only a minimum of footnoting. I am
grateful to Charles Geyh and Russell Wheeler for comments on earlier drafts; errors that remain
are my own.
1. Pelosipaloozais Duplicatedby Democrats in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 7, 2007,
at B6.
2.
Debra Rosenberg, Bench Player, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 2007, at 32.
3.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 58 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 6
(2006).
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Journal with the title, "The Threat to Judicial Independence."4 The op-ed
was part of the rollout for a conference that soon led to the creation of the
"Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary" at the
Georgetown University Law Center. Justice O'Connor will "partner" with
the project to help educate the public about the importance of judicial
independence.
When California Chief Justice Ronald George introduced Justice
O'Connor before a speech in November 2006, he said that when he
searched the Internet for the terms "Sandra Day O'Connor" and "judicial
independence," he found almost 100,000 references. 5 He aptly observed that
"Sandra Day O'Connor" and "judicial independence" have become
"virtually synonymous. ' ' 6
Justice O'Connor could not have chosen a better theme for her public
appearances as a retired Justice. There is no need to belabor the importance
of an independent judiciary to preserving the individual freedoms and
economic opportunities that we as Americans take for granted.7 And Justice
O'Connor is in a uniquely appropriate position to bring the issue to public
attention. As a jurist who served on the United States Supreme Court for
twenty-five years and, before that, on state courts and in a state legislature,
she has a wealth of experience on which to draw. At the same time, having
retired from participation in Supreme Court decision making, she is freed
from the suspicion that she is attempting to aggrandize her own power.
So Justice O'Connor has done the nation a service by bringing the
subject of judicial independence to center stage and by calling attention to
the important values it serves. Unfortunately, however, in describing the
threats to that independence, she has presented a picture that is in some
respects overstated and, in others, incomplete.
Three points in particular deserve comment. First, Justice O'Connor has
painted with too broad a brush in identifying what might be called
"external" threats to the independence of the judiciary. Second, she has not
adequately emphasized what I will call the "internal" aspects of judicial
independence. Finally, although she has discussed the threat to judicial
independence posed by the election of judges in the states, she has said little
about the current process for judicial nominations in the federal system, a
Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J.,
4.
Sept. 27, 2006, at A 18.
Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter's Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs O'Connor,THE
5.
RECORDER, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/LawArchiveFriendly.jsp?
id=Alexander/1 162893919695.
Id. (commenting on Chief Justice George's remarks).
6.
7.
The classic exposition is, of course, Alexander Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78.
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development that may pose as serious a threat as any of the recent events
that she does discuss.
Before elaborating on these concerns, there are two preliminary points
that I would like to acknowledge. First, I am not suggesting that Justice
O'Connor is alone in expressing views such as those I will be quoting here.
On the contrary, many of the same themes have been sounded in recent
months by other judges (including some of Justice O'Connor's active
colleagues on the Supreme Court), by commentators, and even by some
political figures. But because "Justice O'Connor" and "judicial
independence" have become "virtually synonymous," it is likely that Justice
O'Connor's formulations are the ones that future writers will quote.
Second, even before Justice O'Connor began to speak out, the subject of
judicial independence had generated an enormous amount of academic
commentary. In the last few years, the body of writings has expanded even
further. Not only are there numerous individual articles in law journals and
elsewhere, but there have been entire symposia; and the symposia, as
Professor Charles Geyh has aptly stated, have themselves "proliferated like
rabbits." 8 So I have no illusion that I can add any substantial new dimension
to the discussion. Nevertheless, because Justice O'Connor's many speeches
and public interviews have become so central to the debate, I think it is
useful to look closely at what she has said and what we can learn from her
warnings.

I.

"EXTERNAL" THREATS

In her various speeches and the Wall Street Journal op-ed, Justice
O'Connor has talked about several developments that she views with alarm,
including four that I would like to focus on today: acts of violence or threats
of violence directed against judges; proposals to impeach or otherwise
punish judges for their decisions; legislation to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over particular classes of cases; and other legislation that would
limit the decisional autonomy of state or federal courts. From the
perspective of assessing threats to judicial independence, these examples
represent four very distinct categories, and it is important to differentiate
among them.
The first category encompasses acts of violence and threats of violence
directed at judges or their families. It should go without saying that these
are plainly and indisputably illegitimate. No responsible person or
8.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 911 (2006).
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organization asserts that killing or injuring judges is an appropriate response
even to the most wrong-headed judicial decision. It is unfortunately true
that a federal judge's husband and mother were murdered in 2005 by an
embittered plaintiff whose malpractice suit the judge had dismissed. 9 And a
Georgia state judge was shot dead by a criminal defendant who was being
tried in his courtroom.10 But these killings were unrelated to any of the
judicial decisions that have aroused controversy in recent years.
Justice O'Connor, however, after commenting that "death threats [to
federal judges] have become increasingly common," added: "It doesn't help
when a high-profile senator ... suggests there may [be] 'a cause-and-effect

connection' between [judicial] activism and the 'recent episodes of
courthouse violence in this country.""' The "high-profile senator" was
Senator John Comyn of Texas, and Justice O'Connor was not alone in
interpreting his remarks in the way she did. But it would be misleading to
use the Cornyn statement as evidence that "courthouse violence" poses a
threat to judicial independence in America today, or that any responsible
person believes that these acts of violence have occurred as a response to
controversial judicial decisions.
To begin with, Senator Comyn is himself a former judge, having served
for thirteen years on the Texas state courts, including the Supreme Court of
Texas. 2 It is hardly credible that he intended to suggest that violence could
ever be a legitimate response to judicial decisions that a person thinks are
wrong. But if there was any doubt, he made a strong statement on the
Senate floor on the day immediately following the day on which he made
the remarks Justice O'Connor referred to. He stated without qualification
that "there is no possible justification for courthouse violence."' 3
Justice O'Connor is on stronger ground on the specific point she
attributed to Senator Comyn. In the course of an apparently extemporized
speech on the Senate floor, Senator Comyn said this:
I don't know if there is a cause-and-effect connection, but we have
seen some recent episodes of courthouse violence in this
country-certainly nothing new; we seem to have run through a
spate of courthouse violence recently that has been on the news. I
wonder whether there may be some connection between the
perception in some quarters on some occasions where judges are
11,
2005,
Mar.
9.
Judge Killed in Atlanta Courtroom, CBS NEWS,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/1 I/national/main67965 1.shtml (noting recent murder
of the husband and mother of federal judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow in Chicago).
10. Id.
11. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Sen. John Cornyn).
12. 151 CONG. REC. S3235 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Cornyn).
13. Id.
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making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public, that
it builds and builds to the point where some people engage in
violence, certainly without any
justification, but that is a concern I
14
have that I wanted to share.

This was a foolish and thoughtless thing to say, and Senator Cornyn
deserves to be criticized for saying it. But it would be a mistake to elevate
his rambling comment into a major policy pronouncement. Most of his
lengthy speech was devoted to a detailed critique of Supreme Court
decisions, particularly those that have invoked foreign law in support of
rulings interpreting the Constitution of the United States. Given that
context, I am inclined to accept the clarification (or disclaimer) he offered
in his statement the day after the original remarks: "I am not aware of any
evidence whatsoever linking recent acts of courthouse violence to the
various controversial
rulings that have captured the Nation's attention in
15
years."'
recent
So there is no basis for thinking that any responsible political figure
endorses or condones violence against judges. And, as far as I am aware, no
one is asserting, as a descriptive matter, that recent acts of courthouse
violence have been prompted by judges' rulings on political or social issues.
In this light, I find it troubling that Justice O'Connor, in her speeches
about judicial independence, not only refers to courthouse violence and
death threats in the United States; she narrates at some length an episode of
strong-arming and violence directed against judges in a country in Africa. 16
She also alludes more briefly to similar episodes in Russia and Bulgaria in
the last decade of the twentieth century. 17
These portions of her speeches are troubling for two reasons. First, they
make the position of the judiciary seem much more threatened than it is.
Judicial independence would be very much at risk if judges were facing
threats of death or violent attack if they decided cases in a way that did not
meet with the approval of some particular faction or of the citizenry as a
whole. But that is not remotely the reality in the United States today.
Individual judges do face threats to their security from individual
malefactors and Congress is appropriately taking action to deal with that
kind of problem.18 But it does no service to suggest that judges must fear for
14. 151 CONG. REC. S3126 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Comyn).
15. 151 CONG. REC. S3235 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Comyn).
16. O'Connor, supra note 3, at 3-4.
17. Id. at2.
18. See, e.g., Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 660, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 10, 2007); Court Security Improvement Act of
2007, S.378, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by Senate, Apr. 11, 2007).
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their physical safety if they hand down decisions that are seen as wrong or
harmful by one group or another.
The second troubling aspect is that by interspersing accounts of violence
and physical intimidation with references to peaceful (if debatable)
legislative measures, Justice O'Connor subtly (and no doubt
unintentionally) implies that the latter are only one step removed from the
former. There is no justification for equivocation on this point: legislationeven if unwise, even if unconstitutional-is not violence or the threat of
violence.
I turn now to the second category of threats Justice O'Connor has
identified. This category encompasses nonviolent political measures that
would indeed imperil judicial independence if they had substantial support
within the polity-but they do not. Justice O'Connor has discussed two
such measures, one aimed at federal courts and one aimed at state courts.
In her speeches in 2005, Justice O'Connor described a "conservative
conference" where speakers "advocated 'mass impeachment"' of federal
judges.' 9 She added: "Mass impeachments-now that is something we have
not heard suggested until lately. Impeachment for a judge's judicial acts has
been politically taboo since the failure of Justice Samuel Chase's
impeachment back in 1805. ' ' z°

Anyone reading or hearing Justice O'Connor's remarks would probably
get the impression this "conservative conference" represented a movement
to be reckoned with on the political scene. The impression would be
reinforced by Justice O'Connor's use of quotations from "a prominent
House leader" who spoke at the conference. The "prominent House leader"
was in fact Tom DeLay, then the Majority Leader in the House of
Representatives.
I'm confident we would all agree with Justice O'Connor's premise: the
prospect that judges would be impeached and removed from office based on
their decisions would threaten judicial independence in a serious way. But
how real is that prospect today?
Certainly there has been more than talk at a conference. In 2004, the
Constitution Restoration Act was introduced in the House; a companion bill
was introduced in the Senate. The House bill, with the number H.R. 3799,
withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts to hear suits seeking relief
against governments "by reason of that [government's] acknowledgement
of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government., 2' The bill
was awkwardly worded, but it was aimed at litigation challenging displays
19.
20.
21.

O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 101 (2004).
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of the Ten Commandments in public places. And it went further. It provided
that if any federal judge should engage in activity that exceeds the
jurisdiction defined by the legislation, "engaging in that activity shall be
deemed to constitute the commission of an offense for which the judge may
be removed upon impeachment and conviction."22
House Bill 3799 had thirty-seven cosponsors-more than a trivial
number-and, what is more significant, the bill was the subject of a hearing
before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. So it might
appear that the threat of impeaching judges for their decisions was quite
real, at least in the 108th Congress. But appearances are deceiving. If you
look at the list of the bill's sponsors, what stands out is the names that are
not there. F. James Sensenbrenner, who was then Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, was not a sponsor. Nor was Lamar Smith, then the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property. Nor was Howard Coble, now the Ranking Member on that
subcommittee. In short, the Republican leadership of the Judiciary
Committee kept its distance from this bill. Moreover, Chairman
Sensenbrenner made clear, in a lecture at Stanford University in 2005, that3
2
he opposed the use of impeachment as a means of "neuter[ing] the courts.
He has stated unequivocally that "impeachment ought not lie simply
because Congress may disagree with a judge's 'judicial philosophy,' or
because Congress considers a judge's ruling 'unwise or out of keeping with

the times. '24
I do not want to overstate the point. Although Congressman Smith did
not cosponsor House Bill 3799, he has expressed some sympathy for the
idea of impeaching judges "who willfully ignore the law and the
Constitution. 25 But it is telling that, as chairman of the Courts
subcommittee, he did not schedule the bill for markup, and it died with the
108th Congress.2 6 Additionally, bills like House Bill 3799 get no support

22. Id. § 302.
23. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Zale Lecture in Public Policy at Stanford University 4
(May 9, 2005) (transcript available at http://judiciary.house.gov/medialpdfs/stanfordjudges
speechpressversion505.pdf).
24. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding
Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary (March 16, 2004) (transcript available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news03l604.htm).
25. See Chuck Lindell, Smith Echoes DeLay in Criticizing Judges, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, Apr. 8, 2005, at Al1. For the full text of Representative Smith's remarks, see
http://lamarsmith.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=61 1.
26. Indeed, although the legislation was again introduced in the 109th Congress-this time
with fifty cosponsors-Chairman Smith did not even hold a hearing. Constitution Restoration
Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005).
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from Democrats. I conclude, therefore, that the notion of impeaching judges
for their judicial acts has more than fringe support, but not much more.27
In her Wall Street Journal op-ed, Justice O'Connor discussed a
counterpart to impeachment that would affect judicial independence in state
courts.28 This was the "JAL 4 Judges" initiative that had been placed on the
November 2006 ballot in South Dakota as a proposed amendment to the
state constitution. 29 The amendment would have cut back substantially on
judicial immunity; it would also have created an elaborate system of special
grand juries that would "investigate, indict, and initiate criminal prosecution
of wayward judges" for a variety of infractions, including "deliberate
violation of law" and "blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case."3 °
The proponents of the "JAIL 4 Judges" initiative have made no secret
about what they are trying to do: they want to intimidate judges. They have
proudly proclaimed that by wearing their JAIL T-shirts they send "that
intimidation factor flowing through the judicial system." 3 ' So there is no
ambiguity as to their goal; an independent judiciary is exactly what they are
trying to destroy. But they are little more than a fringe group. Their
initiative received only eleven percent of the vote-and that was in the "Red
State" of South Dakota.
I don't want to overstate this point either. A poll taken on September 19,
2006, about six weeks before the election, showed sixty-seven percent
support for the initiative.3 2 The ultimate failure of the measure can be
attributed in part to a vigorous grass-roots campaign led by the executive
director of the State Bar of South Dakota, Thomas Barnett. His "No on E"
Committee gained support "from a broad range of organizations, including
the South Dakota Chamber of Commerce, the State Bar of South Dakota
and the state AFL-CIO."33 By the end of September, Barnett was saying,
27. It might be argued that even if actual removal of a judge through impeachment
proceedings is unlikely, the process of dragging the judge through a bruising and humiliating
impeachment inquiry would be punishment enough to intimidate the judge into acquiescence.
This may be true, but intimidation would result only if the judge reasonably believed that the
process would be initiated. Especially in view of Chairman Sensenbrenner's strongly expressed
views, I do not think any federal judge could have had any fear of impeachment proceedings
based on "activist" or other controversial decisions-even during the era of Republican control
of the House.
28. O'Connor, supra note 4, at A18.
29. For a detailed discussion of the "JAIL 4 Judges" movement, see William E. Raftery,
J.A.LL. 4 Judges: Opponents of an ImpartialJustice System?, JUDGES J., Winter 2007, at 25.
30. See id. (discussing the JAIL 4 Judges movement).
31. Barbie, FAQ: Psychology Behind JAIL T-shirt Design, http://www.jail4judges.org/
FAQFile/tshirtext.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
32. Richard Clough, Initiative Would Let Citizens Sue Judges, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2006, at

6.
33.

Wendy Davis, Getting Out the 'No' Vote, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 15.
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"We're going to kill them dead here ... so no other state has to go through
what we're going through. 3 4 And his group did "kill them dead." In fact, a

poll taken in mid-October showed only twelve percent support, closely
anticipating the outcome on Election Day.35
The lesson to be drawn from the initially favorable response to
Amendment E by the citizens of South Dakota is that demagogic attacks on
the judiciary do have some appeal. We cannot assume that the destructive
consequences of such measures will be immediately obvious to everyone.
But once the public understands what is really at stake, the support
dwindles-in this instance to little more than one voter in ten.36
So I certainly do not criticize Justice O'Connor for speaking out against
the "JAIL 4 Judges" initiative-or, indeed, against proposals to impeach
federal judges for their decisions. On the contrary, I think it is important to
point out why these measures are dangerous and how far they depart from
our traditions. But it is also important not to exaggerate the degree of
support they have among political leaders and citizens.
This brings me to the third category of threats that Justice O'Connor has
identified. This category embraces political measures that do have
substantial support, but should not be viewed as imperiling judicial
independence-although they may be unwise for other reasons.
In particular, Justice O'Connor has expressed concern about legislation
that would strip federal courts of jurisdiction over particular classes of
cases. 37 She listed some of the issues (past and present) that have prompted
proposals of this kind, then added: "The merits of all these measures are
debatable-as long as they're not retaliation for past federal court
decisions."38

Justice O'Connor is correct in saying that recent years have brought a
proliferation of these "court-stripping" proposals.39 Moreover, in contrast to
the idea of impeaching judges for their decisions, at least two of the courtstripping bills have enjoyed substantial support in Congress. One example is
the Pledge Protection Act, which would have eliminated both district court
jurisdiction and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over any
34. Id.
35. Clough, supra note 32, at 6.
36. Ron Branson, who promoted the South Dakota measure, has pledged to continue the
campaign elsewhere in the country. He has predicted that the idea will take hold "in one of
several states with active chapters in the 'Jail4Judges' campaign." Matt Apuzzo, Despite
Election Setbacks, Supporters Will Keep Fighting 'JudicialActivism,' S.F. DAILY J., Nov. 14,
2006, at 4.
37. See O'Connor, supra note 3, at 4-5.
38. Id. at5.
39. See id. at 4-5.
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"question" involving the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance.4' The
bill was approved by the House in 2006 by a vote of 260 to 167, with thirtynine Democrats, as well as most Republicans, in the majority. 4' That is a
strong bipartisan showing. Two years earlier, the House passed a similar bill
removing jurisdiction over challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act.42 The
vote was 233 to 194, with twenty-seven Democrats voting in favor.4 3
Measures like these are generally unwise, and some may be
unconstitutional. But that does not mean that they are properly viewed as
threats to judicial independence. Judicial independence is threatened by
legislative acts that may intimidate judges or (in Justice O'Connor's words)
"strong-arm the judiciary into adopting [the legislature's] preferred
policies."' I do not think that court-stripping bills-or at least those that
have made substantial headway in Congress-fall within that category.
Preliminarily, there is some uncertainty about how broad a point Justice
O'Connor is making. She accepts the legitimacy of some jurisdictionlimiting legislation; what she rejects are measures that can be described as
"retaliation for past federal court decisions."45 The implication is that she
sees a threat to judicial independence whenever legislators promote courtstripping bills with the intent of intimidating judges-irrespective of the
success of their efforts, and even if there is no realistic prospect that any
judges will be influenced by the campaign.
On this premise, Justice O'Connor is probably right in including recent
bills such as those I have described. There is good reason to believe that at
least some supporters of these measures, like the proponents of the "JAIL 4
Judges" initiative, hope that by pressing for such legislation they will send
an "intimidation factor flowing through the judicial system., 46 But if this is
what Justice O'Connor is saying, I disagree with the premise. In my view,
hopes alone do not pose a threat to judicial independence. What should
concern us is the prospect that judges will alter their behavior in response to
legislative initiatives.
Consider, then, the two bills that passed the House in recent years-one
that would have removed jurisdiction over cases involving the Pledge of
Allegiance, 47 the other centering on the Defense of Marriage Act.48 Is it
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2006).
152 CONG. REC. 95, H5433 (2006).
H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
150 CONG. REC. 103, H6612 (2004).
O'Connor, supra note 3, at 6.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Barbie, supra note 31.
H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2006).
H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
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plausible to suggest that a federal judge would reject a challenge to a
governmental practice within the scope of either of these measures out of
fear that the decision would lend fuel to efforts to remove federal-court
jurisdiction over suits of that kind? I do not think so.
Some will argue that this conclusion rests on an idealized view of the
judicial personality. There is a developing literature that talks about judges
as self-interested actors who want to maximize their prestige and their
power.4 9 Taking away jurisdiction is taking away power. Is it really so
implausible that judges might trim their sails to avoid that outcome?
Maybe this could happen-but not when the legislation would affect
only a narrow class of cases like those involving the Pledge of Allegiance or
the Defense of Marriage Act. Suppose, though, that the proposal is to take
away jurisdiction over any claim involving freedom of religion or rights of
privacy, including reproduction. There's a bill in the current Congress that
would do just that."0 It's called the "We the People Act," and it has been
introduced in each of the last two Congresses as well.5 Maybe some judges
would be influenced by the prospect of losing power on that scalealthough I would like to think otherwise. But the "We the People Act" has
never had more than six co-sponsors.52 It has never been the subject of a
hearing. It is not a serious threat.
One other scenario may come to mind. Suppose that Congress were to
pass one of the narrow bills I have referred to-the Pledge Protection Act,
for example. Might some judges then hesitate before issuing countermajoritarian rulings involving other issues out of fear that an unpopular
decision would spur Congress to enact additional or broader restrictions on
federal court jurisdiction? It could happen-but the fact is that even the
Pledge Protection Act could not gain sufficient support to become law in a
Congress controlled by Republicans. And speculation based on
counterfactual hypotheticals is of minimal value in assessing threats to
judicial independence.
It would be going too far to say that no court-stripping measure could
ever have the effect of strong-arming a federal judge into adopting
Congressional policies rather than the judge's own view of what the law
requires. But I am confident that this will not occur as a consequence of any
49. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPERIOR COURT ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
50. See H.R. 300, 110th Cong. (2007).
51. See H.R. 5739, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 4379, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3893, 108th
Cong. (2004).
52. See generally id.
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of the bills that have been considered by Congress in recent years. It is not
relevant that some of the proponents are motivated by a desire to retaliate
for past rulings, and there is no reason to fear that judges will be intimidated
in their future decisions by the threat of "retaliation" of this kind.53
There is, however, another way of looking at these bills-one that
focuses on what would happen if one of these measures were actually
enacted and signed into law. Even if no individual judge is intimidated, is
there a threat to judicial independence if Congress removes the institutional
authority of the judiciary to consider particular claims or issues?
My answer is "no," because I think it is analytically confusing to treat
questions of the proper or necessary role of the federal courts as bearing on
the preservation of independence for federal judges. One can argue, based
on Article III or due process or structural considerations, that a federal
judicial forum should be available for this or that constitutional claim. But
that kind of argument is simply not relevant to judicial independence, which
focuses on the ability of judges to apply their own judgment, limited only
by the rule of law, in the cases before them.
Now at this point those of you who are familiar with constitutional
history may be wondering: What about Ex Parte McCardle?4 In that muchdiscussed 1868 case, the Supreme Court conspicuously avoided deciding
the constitutionality of Congress's Reconstruction legislation.55 It did this
by giving effect to a Congressional limitation on the Supreme Court's own

53. The 109th Congress did enact some limitations on the power of federal courts to
consider claims by alien enemy combatants. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366 (2006). There is no evidence that this legislation has "neutered" the federal
judiciary (to use Congressman Sensenbrenner's term); on the contrary, judges have continued to
issue bold rulings rejecting executive claims arising out of the prosecution of the war on
terrorism. See, e.g., al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). See generally Andrew C.
McCarthy,
Lawfare Strikes Again,
NAT'L
REV.
ONLINE,
June
12,
2007,
http://search.nationalreview.com/ (search "National Review Online" for "Lawfare Strikes
Again" start date "06/12/2007" end date "06/12/2007," then follow "Lawfare Stiikes Again"
hyperlink) (characterizing the Fourth Circuit decision as "[tihe use of the American people's
courts as a weapon against the American people in a war prosecuted by the president ...[a]nd
all for the benefit of an alien sent here to attack us"). Federal judges have reacted in similar
fashion to Congressional legislation restricting judicial review of deportation orders involving
asylum claims. See, e.g., Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). One
commentator described the Lolong decision as "a conservative's message to Congress that it
can't eliminate judicial review." John Roemer, Reversing Itself, 9th Circuit to Hear Asylum
Cases, S.F. DAILY J.,May 8, 2007, at 2.
54. 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
55. Id. at514.
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jurisdiction-a limitation that was enacted for that very purpose. 56 The
effect, of course, was to leave the Reconstruction legislation in place.57
Was this an instance of Congress' using court-stripping legislation to
strong-arm the judiciary into adopting its preferred policies-the paradigm
of interference with judicial independence? Perhaps-though it's important
to point out (as the Court itself did) that Congress had not taken away all
access to the Supreme Court for litigants like McCardle.
Yet even if we view the decision in the worst possible light-as a craven
capitulation to Congressional pressure-I don't think it tells us much about
the situation in the twenty-first century. The case grew out of tumultuous
events that occurred nearly 140 years ago. The constitutional traditions that
we rely on so much today were in a relatively early stage of development.
Nor was the judiciary as strong as it is now. More important, the setting was
unique. The nation had just emerged from a bloody civil war. Congress was
engaged in a bitter struggle with an unelected President over the direction of
Reconstruction. Indeed, while McCardle's case was pending, the Senate
failed by a single vote to sustain articles of impeachment and remove the
President from office. It was truly a moment of constitutional crisis that is
not likely to be replicated in the foreseeable future.
In my view, then, today's court-stripping legislation should not be
viewed as a threat to judicial independence. But as Justice O'Connor noted
in her Wall Street Journal op-ed, Congress has also been considering
legislation of a different kind-legislation that seeks to limit the legal
sources that courts may rely on in interpreting the Constitution.58 The
Constitution Restoration Act actually contained two provisions of this kind;
one addressed to state judges and one addressed to federal judges.59 Section
301 stated that any decision of a federal court, whether made prior to or
after the effective date of the Act, "to the extent that the decision relates to
an issue removed from Federal jurisdiction [by the Act], is not binding
precedent on any State court."6 ° Section 201 would have prohibited federal
courts from relying on foreign or international law in interpreting the
Federal Constitution.6'
Here we are much closer to the heart of the judicial function and thus to
the independence of the judiciary. I testified at the House Judiciary
Committee hearing on the Constitution Restoration Act, and as I said there,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 515.
O'Connor, supra note 4, at A18.
See Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 101 (2004).
Id. § 301.
Id. § 201.
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I believe that both of these provisions are unconstitutional. I am also
convinced that the Supreme Court would take that view. So we are
presented with the question: Is judicial independence threatened by
measures that would intrude on the judicial role if they were to take effect,
but which we can confidently predict will be struck down by the courts?
I find it hard to answer a question that requires so much speculation
about events that have not occurred and probably never will. Unlike courtstripping legislation, proposals to constrain judicial decision making in
constitutional cases have made little headway in Congress. If such
legislation does pose a threat to judicial independence, it is a threat that is
more theoretical than real.
To sum up, the threats to judicial independence that Justice O'Connor
has identified fall into four categories. First, there is the threat of violent
retaliation for judicial decisions. Violence is always an illegitimate tactic,
and no responsible person or organization in this country endorses it.
Second, there are nonviolent, political measures that would indeed imperil
judicial independence if they had substantial support within the polity-but
they do not. Third, there are political measures that do have substantial
support but which should not be viewed as imperiling judicial
independence. Finally, there are measures that would intrude on the judicial
function and thus may be seen as a threat to judicial independence, but
which will never go into effect.
Putting this all together, you might conclude that Justice O'Connor is
indeed "crying wolf." There are movements and leaders on the political
scene who would like to "strong-arm the judiciary into adopting their
preferred policies, 62 but their proposals have no chance of achieving
success. There are some proposals that could possibly become law, but
those do not pose a genuine threat to judicial independence. However, that
is not the end of the story.
II.

"INTERNAL" THREATS

The threats to judicial independence that Justice O'Connor has described
are a diverse group, but they have one important element in common: they
all come from forces outside the judiciary. I believe that there is a second
aspect of judicial independence-the "internal" aspect. I use this term with
some hesitation, because it has been used by other commentators in a

62.

O'Connor, supra note 3, at 6.
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variety of different ways.63 But I haven't yet come up with a better label, so

I will go ahead and use this one. 64 By "internal," I refer to things that judges
themselves do that may threaten their independence. What might those be? I
see at least two possibilities.
At the core, an internal threat arises whenever judges allow themselves
to be influenced in their decisions by considerations that have no proper
role in judicial decision making. Justice Anthony Kennedy captured the idea
nicely in his recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He
said: "Judicial independence is not conferred so judges can do as they
65
please. Judicial independence is conferred so judges can do as they must.
A judge who does as he pleases is not acting with the independence that
Article III contemplates.
There are a number of ways in which a judge might violate this precept.
One illustration comes from an oft-quoted comment by Professor Mark
Tushnet. Professor Tushnet said that if he were a judge, he would decide a
close constitutional case by "mak[ing] an explicitly political judgment:
which result is, in the circumstances now existing, likely to advance the
cause of socialism?" 66 That kind of judgment is, as Professors Ferejohn and
Kramer put it, a reason "that [the] existing legal culture [does not]
recognize[] as appropriate., 67 The same could be said if a judge were to
decide a case in a particular way in order to advance the fortunes of a
political party. Or if a judge were to reach the result that would most likely
aid his own promotion to a higher court or garner praise from newspaper
editorial writers. In situations like these, the judges are deciding cases for
"unacceptable reasons."68 And that kind of behavior, in my view, poses a
threat to judicial independence.
63. For example, Professors Ferejohn and Kramer have called for "[a] more internal view"
of judicial independence, but they rely primarily on "the way courts define their role through
doctrinal development." John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary:InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1038 (2002).
64. The analysis here draws upon remarks by Chief Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth
Circuit at a conference sponsored by the American Bar Association. Judge Boggs's remarks
have not been published. I am grateful to Linda Campbell of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram for
sharing note material on the conference proceedings. For a somewhat similar treatment, see
Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protections, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 221 (2003).
65. Judicial Security and Independence: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on JudicialIndependence] (statement of Justice
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
Anthony
M.
Kennedy),
available
cfm?id=2526&witid=6070.
66. Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424
(1981).
67. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 63, at 972.
68. Id. at 971.
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There are two ways of reaching that conclusion. One is what might be
called essentialist. That is the view that I take Justice Kennedy to be
articulating. For a judge to decide a case in order to advance an agendawhether ideological, or political, or personal-rather than through
application of the rule of law is to pervert the very concept of judicial
independence.
It might be argued that what I am talking about here is not a lack of
independence, but a lack of impartiality. And it is true that the behavior I've
described does not fit the paradigm relied on by Justice O'Connor (and
others). No one is attempting to strong-arm the judge into deciding a case
one way rather than another. But there is strong-arming and there is also
sweet-talking. I believe that the latter can be as destructive of independence
as the former. A judge whose strings are being pulled by someone else is
not independent even if the strings are wholly metaphorical, and even if the
hand pulling the strings is benevolent rather than hostile.
Consider these two situations. Judge A holds that an act of Congress is
constitutional out of fear that he will face impeachment proceedings if he
rules otherwise. Judge B strikes down an act of Congress because she looks
forward to the New York Times editorial praising her wisdom and her
courage. There are differences, of course, between the two kinds of
influence, but in both, the judge's independence has been compromised.
Judge Carolyn Dineen King of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made
this same point recently using an analogous example. In her Hallows
Lecture at Marquette Law School, she quoted a remark by Judge Guido
Calabresi of the Second Circuit to the effect that "the greatest threats to
judicial independence [are] judges with ambition."6 9 As Judge King
explained, "a judge with ambition constantly has his eye on what the
Administration or the Senate Judiciary Committee would think about a
decision under consideration and how the decision would affect his chances
for advancement., 70 Like the judge who seeks approbation from the
editorial pages from the New York Times, the judge who seeks to enhance
his chances for promotion to a higher judicial office departs from the path
of independence laid out in Article III. Again there is no strong-armingthere is not even sweet-talking, except perhaps in the judge's own mindbut if there is substance to Judge Calabresi's perception, the threat to
independence is far more real than the empty talk of "mass impeachment"
that so concerned Justice O'Connor.
69. Honorable Carolyn Dineen King, Hallows Lecture: Challenges to Judicial
Independence and the Rule of Law: A Perspectivefrom the Circuit Courts, 90 MARQ. L. REV.
765, 777 (2007).
70. Id.
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Independent of this analysis, one can reach the same conclusion by
viewing the matter from a consequentialist perspective. If judges are
deciding cases for nonlegal reasons-that is, "reasons that [the] existing
legal culture [does not] recognize[] as appropriate" 71-it is only to be
expected that citizens will come to see judicial independence as a liability
rather than a benefit to society. Similarly, the elected officials who represent
the people in the political branches will no longer see any reason to protect
judges from the reprisals that they themselves expect if they act in ways that
are contrary to the wishes of their constituents.
In her Hallows Lecture, Judge King identified a form of judicial behavior
that does not quite fit the paradigm I have been discussing, but it is close
enough-and her account is alarming enough-that it warrants mention
here. Judge King refers to the phenomenon as "clique voting., 7 2 As she
describes it, what happens is that judges on a court of appeals panel vote
"with or at the direction of other like-minded judges simply because they
share common ideological
objectives ...without a good grasp of the record
73
law.
governing
or [the]
"Clique voting" has come about, Judge King argues, through a
combination of three circumstances. 74 First, because of the politicization of
the appointment process (a development I'll be discussing in the next
section of this lecture), some judges come to the federal appellate bench
primed to view cases through the prism of an ideology.75 Second, because of
"the sheer volume of cases," many appeals receive the "full attention" of
only one judge on a three-judge panel.76 What this means is that "judges are
often effectively forced to rely on 'borrowed intelligence.' 77 Finally, in
contrast to the United States Supreme Court, most court of appeals
decisions "do not receive thoughtful review by anyone other than the
parties., 78 Thus-and this is my summary-it's easy (and almost risk-free)
for a "clique" to ride roughshod over the law and the facts in pursuit of an
ideologically driven outcome.
Judge King reports that "clique voting happens, albeit infrequently, in
more than one (but, I think, not many) of our intermediate federal appellate
courts."7 9 This is a disturbing assertion. As Judge King states, the practice
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 63, at 972.
King, supra note 69, at 784.
Id.
See id. at 782-84.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
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she describes is inconsistent with the rule of law; and because the rule of
law is so closely tied to judicial independence, a threat to one is a threat to
the other. 8
At the same time, I cannot help wondering about the accuracy of Judge
King's account. Her own experience as a judge is limited to the Fifth
Circuit, so any information she may have about other courts is necessarily
secondhand, filtered through the perceptions and predispositions of other
judges. Moreover, I think she underestimates the amount of scrutiny that
court of appeals decisions get today. There is now an array of generalist and
specialized blogs that monitor the federal courts of appeals quite closely.
Even "unpublished" opinions do not necessarily escape scrutiny.
So I think we must reserve judgment on whether there is something
going on that we should worry about. Perhaps now that Judge King has
spoken out about the practice we will hear more-or the practice will stop.
The second kind of internal threat arises when judges say things that step
outside the judicial role. A well-known example is the remarks made by
Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit at the conference of the
American Constitution Society in the summer of 2004. Judge Calabresi
made comments that, as he later acknowledged, were reasonably understood
as opposing the reelection of President George W. Bush. Judge Calabresi
"went on to make a direct comparison between the President and [the Italian
dictator] Mussolini.'
Within days of making this speech, Judge Calabresi wrote a letter to the
chief judge of the Second Circuit apologizing profusely-even abjectlyfor his remarks.82 The fact that he did so is, I think, some evidence of how
harmful such behavior is to the judiciary as an institution. The reason is the
one I have already stated: if judges start behaving like political actors, it is
hard to justify the extraordinary protections that guard their independence.
Judges can also engage in this kind of behavior in the course of deciding
cases. They do so, in my view, when they conspicuously applaud the
purposes of the laws they uphold or condemn the policies underlying the
laws they strike down. A good example is Justice Stevens's dissent in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale.83 In that case, the Boy Scouts challenged a New
Jersey decision holding that the state's public accommodation law
prohibited the Scouts from revoking Dale's membership on the ground that

80.
81.

See id. at 786-87.
In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 697 (Judicial Council of the 2d

Cir. 2005).
82.
83.

See id. at 691-92.
530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Dale was an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.8 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Scouts' membership
Justice Stevens
policies were protected by the First Amendment.
dissented.86 He began his dissent with these words: "New Jersey 'prides
itself on judging each individual by his or her merits' and on being 'in the
vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of
all types from our society."' 87 In the paragraph that followed, he wrote that
''every state law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice
88
with principle.
Can anyone who reads those opening paragraphs doubt that Justice
Stevens sympathized with the New Jersey policy and admired the state for
enforcing it through law? And wouldn't you be at least a little suspicious
that Justice Stevens's position on the constitutional question was influenced
by his view of the underlying state policy?8 9
Of course judges and Justices have their views about policy, and it would
be nalve to think that these views can be completely divorced from the legal
issues that they generate. This is particularly so when, for example, the
governing legal test requires a showing of a "compelling" or "substantial"
governmental interest. But when a judge writes an opinion of the kind
Justice Stevens wrote in Dale, the consequences are twofold. First, it
legitimizes the approach to the judicial role that Justice Kennedy rejected so
84. Id. at 643-44.
85. Id. at 659.
86. See id. at 663.
87. Id. at 663 (quoting Pepper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J.
1978)).
88. Id. at 664.
89. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178-88 (2007), may appear to present another example of this phenomenon.
The Court held that the plaintiff's Title VII pay discrimination claim was time-barred because
Congress has required employees to file charges with the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission within 180 days after a discrete unlawful practice by their employer. Justice
Ginsburg wrote a strong dissent. As reported by Linda Greenhouse in the New York Times,
Justice Ginsburg "summoned Congress to overturn what she called the majority's 'parsimonious
reading' of the federal law against discrimination in the workplace." Linda Greenhouse, Oral
Dissents Give Ginsburg A New Voice on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al. Thus, in
Greenhouse's account, Justice Ginsburg was not simply urging Congress to clarify an
ambiguous statute; she was stating her view on the policy that Congress should adopt. Like
Justice Stevens's comments in Dale, this kind of exhortation embraces a legislative rather than a
judicial judgment. What Justice Ginsburg said, however, was only that "the Legislature may act
to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII." Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2188
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Although the overall thrust of the dissent made
clear that Justice Ginsburg thought that the majority's decision was bad policy as well as a
mistaken interpretation of the statutory language, her actual language remained within the
accepted framework of judicial argumentation.
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emphatically-the notion that judges use their independence to do "as they
please." Second, from the citizen's perspective, it lends support to the
cynical view that law is simply politics carried on by other means. And as
Professor Geyh has aptly observed, "[i]f we ultimately conclude that judges
employ law as a shill to conceal nakedly political decision making of a sort
best reserved for Congress or the people, then insulating such decision
making from the influence of Congress or the people becomes largely
indefensible." 90
There are many other judicial practices that raise questions in this
context. I'd like to say a bit about the recent activities of one of Justice
O'Connor's former colleagues, Justice Antonin Scalia. Although Justice
Scalia is still an active member of the Court, he seems to have become
almost as much of a platform presence as Justice O'Connor. He pops up all
over the country, primarily at law schools, speaking and debating and
answering questions.
Now you're probably asking: who could object to that? Here's a
Supreme Court Justice venturing outside the Marble Palace, going far
beyond the Beltway, meeting and engaging with ordinary people (or at least
ordinary lawyers and law students). He's educating the public about the
Court and the Constitution; he's humanizing the law; and he's making the
judicial system less remote. How could that be anything but a good thing?
Maybe in the end we will all agree that it is a good thing. The problem, if
there is a problem, arises out of the content of Justice Scalia's speechifying.
First, the central theme of his talks is the articulation and defense of an
approach to constitutional interpretation that he refers to as "originalism."
Now that too seems unobjectionable. But the frequency and zest of Justice
Scalia's public appearances can easily give the impression that he is a
Justice with an agenda. To be sure, it is not an ideological or political or
socioeconomic agenda. Rather, his commitment is to a theory of
constitutional jurisprudence. Nevertheless, evangelism, even in the service
of constitutional theory, is hard to reconcile with the ideal of the judge
impersonally applying the law.
This concern is reinforced by the second element of Justice Scalia's
public appearances: his willingness to discuss the application of his
approach to current controversies of the kind that may and do come before
the Court. In one instance, Justice Scalia commented so pointedly on a
pending case that he felt obliged to disqualify himself from participating in
its decision. 9 Yet even if his comments are not so direct or specific as to
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE 281 (2006).
91. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004) (explaining recusal in Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 961 (2004)).
90.
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require recusal, the impression he gives is that at least some judges come to
cases with ready-formed opinions that will not be altered by the arguments
of counsel or of the judge's colleagues. But one of the major purposes of
judicial independence is to give judges the freedom to consider cases with
an open mind. If that is not the way judges decide cases (or if the public
comes to believe that it is not), it is harder to justify continued protection of
judicial independence.
Justice Scalia is not the only member of the Court who engages in this
kind of activity. Justice Breyer too has been touring the country-not just
law schools, but television studios as well. He has been promoting the book
that he wrote to set forth his theory of constitutional decision making-a
theory that in many respects is framed as a response to Justice Scalia's. In
fact, he and Justice Scalia sometimes appear together to debate one another.
They're on their way to becoming a road-show version of James J.
Kilpatrick and Shana Alexander's "Point Counterpoint" on 60 Minutes back
in the 1970s.
In the Scalia-Breyer debates there's an element of showmanship that
may be troubling apart from everything else. But the main concern is the
one I've articulated: that public appearances of this kind promote the idea
that judges approach cases with a view to advancing a jurisprudential
agenda, not with an open mind focused on the particularized arguments of
the parties.
In raising this question about Justices Scalia and Breyer, and, more
generally, in offering these examples of possible internal threats, I want to
be careful not to suggest that judicial independence is now seriously at risk
from behavior of the kind I have described. I do not think it is. Some of the
illustrations I have given are hypothetical. The others are widely scattered;
they are exceptions rather than the rule. But just as I applaud Justice
O'Connor for warning of the possible dangers of measures like "JAIL 4
Judges," I think it is useful to call attention to the possible dangers from the
actions of judges who "do as they please."

HI. THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS

In several of her recent speeches and public interviews, Justice
O'Connor has focused on a new aspect of her broader topic-judicial
elections in the states. When she spoke at New York University in October
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2006, she put "judicial elections" at the very top of her list of threats to
judicial independence.92
The relationship between judicial elections and judicial independence is
a large and complex subject. Each state is different, with its own
Constitution and its own traditions. No state is obliged to follow the federal
model-a model that seeks to insulate sitting judges, to the greatest extent
possible, from the currents of popular preference and factional appeal. No
one can deny that judicial elections may impinge on judicial independence,
but it is also essential to recognize that the people in a particular state may
want it that way.93

There is, however, a parallel phenomenon in the federal system which, as
far as I am aware, Justice O'Connor has not discussed. That is the federal
judicial confirmation process. And in my view the recent developments in
that process may well pose a serious threat to the Framers' ideal of a
judiciary independent of factions and majorities alike. 94
This too is a large topic. Fortunately, there is an excellent recent book on
the subject. It is by commentator Benjamin Wittes, and its title is,
appropriately, Confirmation Wars.95 I encourage you to read that book for a
more thorough treatment of the issue. In my remarks today I will address
only two aspects of the process. Both involve the questions posed to
nominees by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee at confirmation
hearings.
The questions are familiar. In fact, we know exactly what they will be as
soon as one of the Committee members is recognized by the Chairman.
Republican Senator Arlen Specter will express horror at the decision in
United States v. Lopez 96 on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause,
and he will ask the nominee if he agrees with that decision. Democratic
Senator Dianne Feinstein will announce (to everyone's astonishment) that
she is "pro-choice," and she will ask if the nominee supports Roe v. Wade. 97

There's a slight variation in these interrogations, depending on whether
the nomination is for the Supreme Court or one of the courts of appeals, but
the basic thrust is the same, and so is the purpose. The purpose, as Mr.
Wittes observes, is "to wring concessions from would-be [judges] or to tar
92. See O'Connor CelebratesIJA and the Judiciary,IA REP. (Dwight D. Opperman Inst.
of Judicial Admin. at NYU Sch. of L.), Winter 2006-07, at 2, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/institutes/judicial/newsletters/newsletter5.pdf.
93. At some point, due process concerns may be implicated, but consideration of that topic
is beyond the scope of this article.
94. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. See BENJAMIN WITrEs, CONFIRMATION WARS (2006).
96. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
97. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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them as unworthy." 98 The Senators seek "to pressure nominees . . . either to
swear allegiance to a particular set of ideas being actively contested in court
or to offer opponents a ready ground for their opposition." 99
I hope it is evident why this process poses a threat to judicial
independence. Consider this comment on the practice:
If this line of questioning were to be followed further any
candidate for the federal judiciary would have to satisfy the
majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee that he was in line
with that majority's view ....The danger of the particular kind of
nonsense that has been going on in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's hearings is that the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial functions may be broken down. °°
These words appeared in an editorial in the New York Times. What is
remarkable is that they were written 50 years ago, and they were prompted
by questions asked by Southern segregationist Senators at the confirmation
hearing of Justice John Marshall Harlan. (I am indebted to Mr. Wittes for
unearthing the editorial.) But they are equally apt today. And, as Mr. Wittes
writes, questions like the ones that have become so familiar "create an
irresolvable conflict for the conscientious nominee: He or she cannot
provide what the Senate wants without either ceding to its members some
little bit of his or her ability to decide controversial cases or misleadingly
appearing to do so. ''° If the nominee chooses the first course of action, he
compromises his independence; if he chooses the second, he taints the
process and sets higher hurdles for future nominees.
Interestingly, there is a counterpart to these interrogations in the setting
of state judicial elections. In that setting, it is now commonplace for singleissue advocacy groups to send questionnaires to judicial candidates. As one
judge reported at a recent conference, "if one doesn't answer, one gets a
bullet on the website indicating refusal to answer."' 2 The consequence, one
supposes, is that the group will seek to mobilize its supporters to vote
against that candidate.l°3
98.

WrrrES, supra note 95,

99.

Id.

at 94.

100. Id. at 91 (quoting Editorial, DangerousNonsense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1955, at E8).
101. Id. at 102.
102. Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at
the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 141, 150 (2006)

(quoting comment by conference participant).
103. In this connection, I note that Justice O'Connor has expressed some second thoughts
about her vote in Republican Party of Minnesota. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002), to strike

down a state court rule prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on
"disputed legal or political issues." See Hirsch, supra note 5. Her comments can be interpreted
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Certainly the spread of these, questionnaires is a cause for concern.
However, their impact on candidates is diluted by several circumstances:
the organization's electioneering materials may or may not reach voters;
voters may or may not care enough about that one issue to let it determine
their votes.
The confirmation setting is very different. The effect is not diffuse but
concentrated. The nominee knows that he will never become a judge unless
his answers are satisfactory to the handful of Senators whose votes in
committee will determine whether the nomination is reported out. The
pressure to answer is thus far greater than it is in the state election setting.
And for the reasons given by the New York Times half a century ago, that
pressure poses a real threat to the ability of courts to serve, in Hamilton's
words, as "the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative

encroachments." 104

The second aspect of the confirmation hearings is more subtle, but
equally disturbing. Here are some of the questions that have been asked of
nominees to the federal courts of appeals:
*

"[W]hat do you think of the Supreme Court's efforts to curtail
10 5
Congress's power [under the Commerce Clause]?

" "[Why shouldn't Congress] pass a crime bill that would put cops on
10 6
the streets of our cities?'
"

"In light of growing evidence that a substantial number of innocent
people have been sentenced to the death penalty, does that provide
support in your mind for the two federal district court judges who
0 7
have recently struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional?"'

as implying that the Court's decision upholding First Amendment rights in the context of
judicial elections may contribute to the erosion of judicial independence in the states.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
105. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 795 (2003) [hereinafter Estrada Hearing] (question from Sen. Herb
Kohl).
106. Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of William H. Pryor, Jr. to Be Circuit
Judge for the Eleventh Circuit and Diane M. Stuart to Be Director, Violence Against Women
Office, Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 79
(2004) (question from Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
107. EstradaHearing, supra note 105, at 796 (question from Sen. Kohl).
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*

"What is the government's role in balancing protection of the
environment against protecting private property rights?"1 °8

*

"Should a judge be required to balance the public's right to know
against a litigant's right to privacy when the information sought to
be sealed could keep secret a public health and safety hazard? And
what [are] your views regarding the new local rule of the District of
South Carolina on this issue, which [bans] the use of sealed
settlements altogether?"' 9

What we see in these and other questions is that they blend policy and
law, what the law is and what it ought to be. Anyone watching the hearings
would get the message that there really is no difference.
Why is that troublesome? I see two levels of concern. For the first, I'll
draw again on the Wittes book. "To the extent that the public comes [to
treat the task of judging merely as an exercise of raw political power], the
prophecy will tend to fulfill itself .... We cannot have independent courts
without believing in them, after all.""' 0
Now you might respond that only a handful of C-Span junkies watch
enough of the hearings to absorb any sort of impression at all based on the
specific questions asked of nominees, or even the recurring patterns in those
questions. I would have to agree. But that's not an adequate response,
because the impressions that count are those held by political leaders,
journalists, and others who influence the relations between the judiciary and
the political branches. That's what Mr. Wittes means when he speaks of the
self-fulfilling prophecy.
And it's not just a state of mind. That brings me to the second level of
concern, and it harkens back to a point I've made earlier in these remarks in
other contexts. To the extent that political actors believe that adjudication is
simply politics in robes, there is no reason to provide the judiciary with any
more independence than the political branches. If you don't like the judges'
decisions, punish the judges. Or take away the judges' authority to reach the
kinds of results you don't like. Or (if you really don't like the decisions),
remove the judges from office.
As Mr. Wittes points out, the protection of judicial independence derives
more from norms and traditions than from the compulsion of the

108. Id.
109. ConfirmationHearing on FederalAppointments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 77 (2003) (question from Sen. Kohl).
110. WiTrEs, supra note 95, at 103.
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constitutional text."' If the political actors stop believing that law is
something outside politics, there is little reason for them to adhere to those
traditions.
Indeed, both Mr. Wittes and Professor Geyh have gone further. They fear
that if the Senators succeed in imposing their will on nominees at
confirmation hearings, this will embolden the Senate (and maybe the House
as well) to cast off other norms that today protect judicial independence." 2
Having said that, I will add that, like Mr. Wittes, I do not think we have
yet reached the point where the protective traditions have gone by the
board. As I have already said, impeaching judges for their decisions is a
fringe idea; limits on the decision making powers of judges are a long way
from enactment. But we should not be complacent about the corrosive
effect of hearings that13"treat[] the task of judging merely as an exercise of
'
raw political power."'
IV. CONCLUSION

I have strayed rather far from Justice O'Connor's speeches and writings,
but now I'd like to return to them. Toward the end of her Wall Street
Journal op-ed, Justice O'Connor wrote: "An independent judiciary does not
mean, of course, that it is somehow improper to criticize judicial
decisions."... 4 But a few paragraphs earlier, she talked in a very different
vein about criticisms of the judiciary. Here is what she said:
[T]he breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at
the judiciary may be unmatched in American history ....

Elected

officials routinely score cheap points by railing against the "elitist
judges," who are purported to be out of touch with ordinary
citizens and their values. Several jeremiads are published every
year warning of the dangers of judicial supremacy and judicial
tyranny. Though these attacks generally emit more heat than light,
using judges as punching
bags presents a grave threat to the
5
independentjudiciary."

I do not see how that passage can be read other than as saying that when
elected officials rail against elitist judges, or when writers publish
"jeremiads" against "judicial tyranny," they do present a threat-indeed a
"grave threat"-to judicial independence. And Justice O'Connor is not
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 85, 103.
Id. at 103.
O'Connor, supra note 4, at A18.
Id. (emphasis added).
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alone in expressing that view. Senator Patrick Leahy, the chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, sounded a similar note at the hearing that
featured Justice Kennedy as its sole witness. 1 6 Here is some of what
Senator Leahy said:
It is most unfortunate that some in this country have chosen to
use dangerous and irresponsible rhetoric when talking about
judges. We've seen federal judges compared to the Ku Klux Klan,
called the focus of evil, and, in one unbelievable incident, referred
to as more serious than a few bearded terrorists who fly into
buildings.... The high-pitched rhetoric should stop for
the sake of
the judiciary.... 117

our judges and the independence of

A bit later in the hearing, Senator Leahy returned to this theme, saying:
I've noticed with great apprehension the rise in volume and
vehemence [of] attacks on judges and their decisions, both from
outside and sometimes [inside] the government. I know Justice
O'Connor has criticized the uncivil tones of attacks on the
judiciary in a speech. She said that8 this would actually endanger
the independence of the judiciary."
Senator Leahy invited Justice Kennedy to join in this condemnation,119
and he had good reason to think that he would do so. After all, there is
probably no one who has defended judicial independence with more passion
than Justice Kennedy. And there is probably no one with a more exalted
notion of the judicial role. But Justice Kennedy did not rise to the bait. He
began his response by saying, "Democracy is a pretty hurly-burly operation,
rough and tumble . ... ,,120 He reminded Senator Leahy of the "tremendous
controversy over what the [Supreme Court] did" in McCulloch v.
Maryland,12 1 Chief Justice Marshall's decision upholding the power of
Congress to create a national bank.122 He then said: "So the idea of criticism
and disagreement is nothing new. And I think that the scurrilous, really
shameful remarks that
you refer [to] are something that democracy has
23
learned to live with."'
116. Senate Hearing on JudicialIndependence, supra note 65 (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
117. Id.

118. Id. This transcription differs from the one in NEXIS. Senator Leahy was swallowing
some of his words, but I am confident that the version in the text represents what he was saying.
119. See supra Part I.
120. Senate Hearing on Judicial Independence, supra note 65 (testimony of Justice

Kennedy).
121. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
122. Senate Hearing on Judicial Independence, supra note 65 (testimony of Justice

Kennedy).
123. Id.
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Tellingly, Senator Leahy immediately slid into the question of
impeaching judges for their decisions. He quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist
on the point and elicited agreement from Justice Kennedy, who said: "It's
part of our constitutional tradition that the decisions of the court... are not
2 4
the bases for impeachment."'
We see here in microcosm two unfortunate aspects of the arguments
made by some of those who defend judicial independence. First, there is a
tendency to blur distinctions-here, between intemperate language and calls
for impeachment; in Justice O'Connor's speeches, between threats of
violence and political action. Second, notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's
disclaimer, there is the belief that criticism of judges, if sufficiently
"uncivil" or "high-pitched," is itself a threat to judicial independence.
That won't do. It is certainly legitimate to condemn those who criticize
the judiciary in intemperate language or with over-the-top analogies. But to
suggest that such criticism endangers the independence of the judiciary is
itself irresponsible-and in the long run will only undermine that
independence. Just as, in America, no one is above the law, no one is above
criticism, including criticism that is nasty and ugly and stupid. To suggest
that it's OK to criticize judges, but only as long as you do it in language
appropriate for a debating club, is to lend force to assertions that judges
have become the new kings in our society.
I think there has been extravagant rhetoric on both sides, and I would
like to see it ratcheted down. But even if it is not, I don't think that any of
the developments that Justice O'Connor and others have described have
come close to threatening judicial independence, at least in the federal
system. There is no evidence that either the rhetoric or the proposed
legislation has succeeded in strong-arming any court or judge into deciding
cases one way rather than another.
For example, I have already mentioned that the House Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on a bill that would have prohibited federal
judges from relying on foreign law in interpreting the United States
Constitution. 12 That was in 2004. What happened in 2005? The Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Roper v. Simmons, 126 holding that the
Constitution prohibits capital punishment for murderers under the age of
28
eighteen. 127 The Court once again cited foreign law. 1

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
See supra Part I.
543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
Id. at 575-78.
Id.
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That is what we would expect. That is how our independent judiciary
carries out its work. And if I have taken issue today with some of Justice
O'Connor's formulations, it is not from any doubt about her dedication to
judicial institutions or the value of the enterprise she has undertaken. It is
wrong to be alarmist, but it is equally wrong to be complacent. I hope that
Justice O'Connor will continue to call attention to the importance of judicial
independence-without exaggerating the threats posed by people who,
wittingly or otherwise, would undermine it. And I would certainly be
interested to hear her thoughts on the direction the judicial confirmation
process has taken-a development which, if not restrained, could pose a
genuine threat to the "independent spirit in the judges"' 29 that is essential to
the performance of their duties.
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